From Positional to Valence Issues? Ideology, Leadership, Globalization, and Electoral Choice*

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Abstract

Recent research suggests that globalization is a factor that undermines the salience of the left-right economic dimension for individual voting decisions. Part of this research further suggests that voters compensate by weighting more their attitudes on non-economic ideological dimensions or their partisanship. But there is an alternative plausible explanation: where voting on economic or positional issues is reduced, this will be replaced by ‘valence’ issues: evaluations of party performance and competence primarily but not exclusively expressed around leadership preferences. Moreover, the claim that the effects of ideology are reduced by globalization is still contestable. We explore our hypothesis with data from Module 3 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Findings suggest that in more globalized settings both valence and positional elements of party competition are enhanced.

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Introduction

There is substantial debate on the question of whether globalization leaves a significant imprint on democratic politics. An extensive literature debates whether or not, or more usually, to what extent, globalization significantly constrains states’ policy options, and thus reduces choices open to governments, political parties, and mass electorates. Recent findings suggest that globalization may reduce the accountability of governments to their voters, particularly for their economic performance (Hellwig 2001; Hellwig 2007; Hellwig and Samuels 2007). It may even have the effect of reducing voter turnout (Steiner 2010).

In this paper we add to these debates by further exploring the electoral consequences of globalization. Some findings so far suggest that economic globalization not only reduces economic voting by decreasing perceptions of accountability but also that it moderates the effect of ideology on voting (Hellwig, 2008). This argument tests and appears to confirm that government’s policy options are constrained and therefore it follows that policy attitudes tend to matter less for the calculus of voting.

We revisit these claims on two different dimensions. First, if the effect of ideology is reduced in settings of high financial integration, then the effect of valence evaluations centred on concerns of performance and leadership could be augmented. Second, we also propose that while constraint theory might suggest that left-right ideology has a diminishing effect, an alternative vein of theory about the consequences of globalization merits more investigation. Globalization may encourage governments to protecting citizens from the adverse effects of globalization, compensating them for whatever negative consequences to which they are exposed. We use the advance release
of Module 3 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to give our hypotheses a preliminary test. Findings suggest that both leadership evaluations and voter party policy proximity are enhanced as influences in highly globalized settings.

In what follows, we first conduct a brief review of the literature on globalization and politics and set up our theoretical argument and hypotheses. We proceed in the next part to a discussion of methodology, the data and the results of our estimations. We conclude with the discussion regarding the implications of our findings for voting models, party competition and democratic politics in general.

Globalization and Politics

Globalization is a phenomenon that has been the subject of much research, attention, and commentary over the past three decades. A huge literature has emerged, a summary of which would require an entire book, or series of books, and a list of references many, many pages. Debate continues on several fronts, much of which remains unresolved: the extent to which globalization is new, or ongoing since at least the consolidation of capitalist economic relations into a world market; how to define globalization; the dimensions and measurement of globalization; what its consequences are across several dimensions, including public policy; and what the normative implications of such consequences may be for human well-being. This is not the place for a deep historical review of the process of globalization. Nor are we concerned with questions of whether the processes assumed to be associated with globalization are new or old phenomena, and the extent of their implications. The motivation in our research is whether, and to what extent, processes attributed to globalization drive electoral politics.
However, some kind of working definition of globalization is necessary. We recognise that globalization takes cultural, social, economic and political forms not necessarily independent from each other. These forms are interconnected when, for example, economic or technological processes might lead to globalization influencing cultural development. We refer here mainly to a country’s integration into the global financial system through the flow of goods, services, financial and human capital. The terms economic openness, financial integration or globalization in general will be used henceforth interchangeably to refer to these processes. Most typically, two indicators have featured in the measurement of economic globalization: external trade dependence, measured by the value of imports and exports over GDP; and financial integration, measured by financial flows or assets, inward and/or outward. For reasons explained below, we will focus here primarily on financial integration as the key indicator, taking as the most important indicator each country’s inward and outward stocks of capital as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

A large part of the research that explores the effects of economic globalization on politics and society is concerned with one main question: what are the implications of economic openness for partisan politics as expressed by specific policy outcomes? The related literature on social expenditure and the welfare states is significant (for recent interventions see Potrafke, 2009; Burgoon 2010). There are two main arguments advanced in this area. The first one is about government constraint. Financial globalization increasingly constrains the leverage that policy makers have and reduces the ‘policy capacity’ of the state (Cerny, 1994).¹ This results in situations where there is little difference between government policy outputs and the policy proposals of the
opposition (Strange, 1995). Scholars argue that financial integration ultimately encourages party convergence to neo-liberal policies by prompting parties of the left to move rightwards (Mishra, 1999; also see Adams et al., 2009).²

A second line of research suggests that economic openness and the resulting economic risk and employment insecurity increases demand and supply for welfare policies (the compensation theory). Governments will try to protect citizens against globalization-associated risks and will increase social expenditure (Rodrik, 1998; Garret, 1998). A related line of argument is that the demand is driven by deindustrialisation, analytically distinct but assumed by most to correlate with globalization, at least in advanced OECD economies (Iversen and Cusack 2000). This is especially true in the case of leftist governments (Garret, 1998). According to this view, globalization not only does not increase constraints on policy-making but rather magnifies the role of the parties and party agency, where parties of the left promote social expenditure and investment in human capital, and those on the right resist it (Boix, 1998).

Relatively neglected in the literature of globalization is the question of the effects of globalization on mass electoral politics (although see the summary in Kayser, 2007). Most emerging work on this topic has as its starting point what above is termed the constraint theory: namely, that economic globalization constrains the options available to governments in monetary and fiscal policy, policy differences between alternative governments therefore narrowing (as described above). Findings in this area suggest that governments also become less accountable to the mass public in terms of the state of the national economy (Hellwig 2001; Hellwig 2007; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hellwig, Ringsmuth, and Freeman 2007). This is not just because their policies are increasingly
the same, but also because voters perceive governments to be less ‘in control’, or able to ‘make a difference’.3

Following the same logic, recent research suggests that globalization is likely to be a factor that undermines the salience of the left-right economic dimension for individual voting decisions (Hellwig 2008). Globalization does seem to be associated with the reduction of trade union density, one of the structural factors underpinning a socio-economic cleavage (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008, 139-148). Part of this research further suggests that voters compensate by weighting more their attitudes on non-economic ideological dimensions or their partisanship. There is some evidence for these claims, although the effects are modest.

The argument that we advance here is based on some of the empirical and theoretical considerations described above. First, if the ‘constraint’ hypothesis is correct then economic globalization might make utility calculations based on ideological/policy dimensions increasingly difficult. More specifically it will make it harder to make decisions based on utility calculations. In cases of party convergence, voters will not be able to sufficiently differentiate between the parties. On the other hand, globalization might render party policy proposals less credible if voters feel that governments are constraint in their ability to manoeuvre along distributive policies.

Second, the salience of the socio-economic policy dimension appears to be in decline during the last quarter of the 20th century. Numerous studies suggest that alternative non-class based cleavages are gaining in importance (see, Inglehart, 1990). For some of these studies this process is a consequence of globalization (Kriesi et al 2006; 2008). Additionally, the structural economic changes associated with globalization
seem to mediate the effect of ideology on voting. Hellwig (2008) demonstrates that some groups of the electorate have less of an incentive to cast their vote based on traditional policy appeals. This is the case especially for those employed in the service sector and in industries exposed to international competition. He reaches the conclusion that ‘both deindustrialisation and globalization reduce the salience of the left and right dimension of political contestation’ (p. 703, emphasis added).

This leads to the first hypothesis:

\textit{H1a: As a country becomes more integrated into the global financial system, policy related attitudes will matter less in individual voting decisions.}

Previous studies (Hellwig, 2008) have suggested that the above might be the case, but also suggest that voters tend to compensate for the loss of the ‘ideological shortcut’ by weighing more other attitudes such as their partisanship.

We aim to further test this claim, by adding another set of variables in consideration. We propose that where voting on economic or positional issues is reduced, this will be replaced by ‘valence’ issues: evaluations of performance and competence primarily, but not exclusively, expressed around leadership preferences.

The ‘valence’ framework of analysis was first conceptualised by Stokes (1963). Under this interpretation of politics voters appraise political parties in terms of widely shared goals such as economic growth, rather than opposed policy platforms. Effective, efficient and competent government and a strong economy are the main criteria for voters’ judgments of this nature. This is a recent interpretation of British politics in the context of the decline in voting by class, weaker party loyalties, and the convergence of party promises (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whitely 2004). Belanger and Meguid
(2008) also find valence to be important for electoral decision making in Canadian elections. Vowles (2009) finds valence effects in the 2008 New Zealand election. Of course, valence evaluations are far from a new phenomenon. But this suggests that ‘valence’ is a prime candidate that could replace policy driven voting if indeed such a process has been triggered by globalization.

This leads to the second hypothesis underpinning this paper.

\textit{H2: As a country becomes more integrated into the global financial system, valence considerations will matter more for individual voting decisions.}

For at least one of our hypothesis (namely H1a) there is however a caveat. The theory behind the expectation that the effect of ideology will decrease as financial integration decreases is based on constraint theory. It does not take into account the claims by proponents of the compensation hypothesis. In this scenario, spending on the welfare state by leftist governments becomes more pronounced to counter-balance unwanted effects of globalization. According to one of the more robust findings in the literature, inequality increases under globalization, creating the conditions for more demand for compensation. If this alternative prevails, there is no reason to expect an outcome such the one described by H1a. Quite the opposite: one would expect at least part of the electorate to weigh their utility from government policy more heavily. Indeed there is recent evidence to suggest that ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization differ in the in the intensity of their policy preference and their propensity to vote for left parties (Walter, 2010). This leads to hypothesis H1b specifying exactly the opposite outcome:

\textit{H1b: As a country becomes more integrated into the global financial system, policy related attitudes will matter more in individual voting decisions.}
Data and Methods

The data for this paper come from the 3rd Module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, 2010). This latest release of Module 3 incorporates electoral study data from 14 countries as in Table 1. With the addition of the 2008 New Zealand Election Study we have increased the sample to 15. As explained in Table 1 due to data constraints 3 of the 15 countries (Australia, Belarus and Thailand) had to be dropped from the analysis, leaving us with 12 country cases.

Dependent Variable

As just noted, the models presented here use incumbent voting, that is, for the largest party in government as dependent variable. In the cases where coalitions where involved the party of the Prime Minister or President was coded as 1 and voters of all the other parties as 0, even if some of those parties might have been junior coalition partners in the government. Table 2 presents the parties and leaders for which voting is considered to be voting for the incumbent in the models below. We should note that in the case of Switzerland, the fact that government is always a coalition between the four main parties complicates the selection of ‘governing party’ as well as several of the other estimates. For Switzerland only, the left-right distance data in Table 3 and Figure 1 below is based on the vote-weighted ideological positions of all government parties. For the multi-level analysis we still use the largest party of the coalition for the Swiss case. We have repeated the analysis first by setting the dependent variable for Switzerland as a choice between the largest coalition party and parties outside of the coalition and, second, by including all government parties in the dependent variable. The results still support the
substantive conclusions of this paper. We acknowledge the fact that alternative specifications might produce different results and/or provide more information regarding the status of our hypothesis and we intend to examine these specifications in future extensions of this project. We believe that the current specification is still a valid test.

Independent Variables

Globalization Measures

The argument in this paper is that globalization is a ‘modifying’ variable that, according to the constraint hypotheses, acts a) as an agent that suppresses the effects of ideology and b) as a catalyst that accelerates the effect of valence evaluations. As previously noted globalization is in itself a vague concept, fact that makes measurement and operationalization a particularly difficult exercise. Even by narrowing our focus on economic globalization, as we do in this paper, as yet there does not seem to be a ‘gold standard’ that is uniformly used as a measure. However, there is some convergence in many studies that ‘economic openness’ is adequately reflected in measures of trade dependence and capital inflows and outflows. These measures taken separately, or in composite measures are the most commonly used globalization indicators in many of the aforementioned studies and a similar measure is employed in this paper, namely stocks of externally-sourced capital invested in a country plus capital stocks originating in that country and invested elsewhere, as a percentage of GDP. This represents each country’s level of international financial integration and the data that we employ here come from the updated External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Initial modelling of these effects indicated levelling-off at higher levels of
financial integration, so this indicator is logged (after adding 1 to avoid excessive outlier effects elsewhere in the distribution).

The main ‘position’ variable used in the analysis below is the voter’s ideological distance from the main governing party. The standard self and party placement on 11 point scales ranging from left to right is the variable that is employed here. This is the absolute distance between the position of the voter and that of the main governing party. Module 3 contains a number of other questions that could constitute ‘positional’ components such as questions on the party that represents respondent’s view best. But these variables are highly correlated with others included in the model (for example, party identification) and therefore have not been considered here.

### Valence

CSES Module 3 includes a number of questions from which one could operationalise valence evaluations. There are questions on leaders evaluations, on government performance, and on party competence regarding the most important issue. We focus here on leaders for two main reasons. The first has to do with concerns about endogeneity. Those promoting the idea of valence politics (Clarke, et al, 2004) suggest that leadership evaluations are indeed exogenous to vote, but one would be hard pressed to make a similar case for survey items such as party competence on the most important issue. The second is that from all three available survey items, leadership is less likely to be contaminated by policy attitudes and therefore provide an, in a sense, ‘purest’ measure of valence. Table 2 also reports the leaders for which evaluations are drawn.
Country Case Composition

One more methodological issue remains. As this is an advance release of module 3 of the CSES, our country cases are limited to twelve.\textsuperscript{4} Table 3 lists them again, with data on several variables of relevance. First, the log of financial integration indicates a distribution between less globalized countries, beginning with Brazil, and gradually rising to end up with more globalized countries, three of them in Scandinavia, raising the question of potential cultural bias. However, the inclusion of Taiwan as another relatively highly globalized country helps assuage this concern. Nonetheless, these countries do not represent the entire range of possibilities that would appear in a more comprehensive sample. Potential sources of what one might term ‘country composition bias’ are explored in the rest of the table. There seems little systematic relationship between financial integration and party system fragmentation, another possible source of bias for our assessments of left-right distance, nor in Presidential power, that might affect leadership evaluations. Two strong Presidencies fall at the bottom of the distribution, admittedly, confirming earlier findings that there is a correlation between strong Presidencies and low globalization (Vowles 2008). Nevertheless, these are potentially confounding variables needed as controls. These are matters we further address in our model specification below.

Figure 1 scatters the only consistent pattern displayed in this data: a relationship between financial globalization and the average distance on the left-right scale of respondents, by country, to the position of the main government party. In the more globalized countries, that distance is smaller, supporting constraint theory. In these
countries, respondents tend to perceive the range of ideological options around the
government to be smaller and locate themselves closer to the government position.

Model Specification

Our hypotheses specify that economic globalization has modifying effects on policy and
valence attitudes. To test this we include two interaction terms in the model. One is the
international financial integration (IFI) percentage of GDP multiplied by Leadership
Evaluations and the same variable interacted with ideological distance between
respondents and the position of the government on the left-right scale as ascribed by
CSES country collaborators. The full model specification is as follows:

\[
[\text{Incumbent Voting}] = B_0 + B_1 [\text{Leadership Eval.}] - B_2 [\text{Left-Right Distance}] + B_3
[\text{IFI}*\text{Leadership}]) + B_4 [\text{IFI}*\text{Left_Right}] + B_5 [\text{Party Id-Gov}] + B_6 [\text{Gov Performance}]+
B_7 [\text{IFI}]+e
\]

If hypothesis H1a were to be correct we would expect B_4 to be positive revealing
a lesser effect of ideology on vote as financial integration increases. Obviously a negative
sign would confirm H1b, that is the effect of policy attitudes will conform more the
compensation hypothesis. As regards, H2 we expect that B_3 will have the same positive
sign as B_1 . The models also include two controls for main government party
identification and evaluations of government performance.

Results

Table 4 reports the results from two different estimations. In model 1 we run a
hierarchical (multi-level) model letting the coefficients of both leadership and left-right
distance vary randomly across countries without including the interaction terms, while in
model 2 we again let the coefficients of both leadership and left-right vary randomly
across countries and include the two interaction terms as described above.\(^5\) Coefficients
and signs for the control variables are as expected. Government party identification and
positive evaluations of government performance tend to increase the log odds of voting
for the incumbent. As the drop in variance from model 1 to model 2 (for the coefficients
of Left Right and Leadership) suggests, there is some variation explained by the cross
level interactions that are included in model 2. While the main effects seem to be
dropping out in Model 2 the interaction terms are significant.

In circumstances of reduced financial integration positive evaluations of the
president or the Prime Minister do not seem to affect the log odds of voting for the
governing party. The same goes for the main effects of ideological distance. However,
the interaction for leadership evaluations with FDI supports H2. The positive sign
suggests that as economic globalization increases leaders matter more.

Despite the country-level patterns indicated in Figure 1, for the second interaction
the sign refutes the constraint hypothesis (H1a) and appears to confirm that of
compensation (H1b). While constraint theory anticipates a positive sign we get a negative
sign, suggesting that as financial integration increases policy attitudes weigh more
heavily on voters’ calculations. This finding generates an intriguing insight: while policy
distance is indeed smaller in more globalized economies, it matters more.

Setting all other values at their means, Figures 2 and 3 present graphically the
effects of both leadership evaluations and ideology on vote over the values of the variable
measuring financial integration.\(^6\) In Figure 1 the effect of leadership tends to increase
together with FDI. In the case of ideology, the effect appears to be non-existent in cases of very low financial integration but it does become significant (and stronger) as globalization increases. We should note here that this finding could be driven by our country sample as many of the highly globalized countries here are in Scandinavia, where policy attitudes tend to be traditionally a strong predictor of voting. We observe, however, that these are also countries that tend to have minority and coalition governments, reducing the clarity of responsibility for policy accountability. To test the possibility of cultural effects, we performed a clustered robust standard errors analysis after dropping Norway, Sweden and Finland and the results still support the substantive conclusions of this paper. With more cases from future releases of module 3, these questions can be further pursued.

Alternative versions of the models have been tested with controls for party system fragmentation (that could have implications for ideological distance) and Presidential power (with potentially implications for leadership). In both cases our findings remained substantively the same, and neither of these control variables was statistically significant.

Conclusions

Our findings confirm H2. Leadership matters more in vote choice for and against a government in situations of higher globalization than in those of lower international financial integration. This confirms an expectation that the effect of valence considerations will increase as policy attitudes effects tend to diminish. However, in conjunction with our other finding this probably not the correct interpretation. It may be
the case that in highly globalized setting both valence and positional components of politics tend to be enhanced. That is, more financial integration, more “politics”.

H1a is apparently refuted and H1b confirmed. Preliminary analysis did show that policy distance between voters and governments was less under conditions of high globalization, confirming a key precondition for constraint theory. But comparing highly globalized with less globalized countries, the effect of policy distance on vote choice for or against incumbents is still stronger in conditions of high globalization, even if policy distance is smaller. On reflection, this is not a surprise. Studies of Scandinavian economies provide the classic illustration of compensation theory, and the theory has its origins in this literature. Provisionally, our findings suggest that the theory may apply more generally. The moderation of Scandinavian politics compared other countries, aligned with the relatively high levels of political engagement found in those societies makes ‘distance less, matters more’ a plausible inference.

Recent work on economic voting also gives further food for thought. Its effects are apparently low in conditions of both higher globalization and higher social expenditure, the exact compensation theory scenario (Duch and Stevenson 2008, 205). On the other side of the coin, economic voting is highest where globalization and social expenditure are both low. In those countries, a relative absence of social expenditure and the withdrawal of responsibility of the state for the economy makes people more vulnerable to economic fluctuations and exogenous shocks. This makes sense. But does it make sense to interpret the possibility of increased globalization associated with higher social expenditure as leading to ‘a crisis of democratic accountability’ (Duch and Stevenson 2008, 206). How are limited governments in deregulated markets more
accountable in a democratic sense, except in the short term and in a sense that is quite narrow? How are governments in globalized societies seeking to protect their citizens in response to their apparently expressed needs somehow generating a crisis of democracy? Are voter responses to exogenous shocks that can have strong economic consequences like ‘drought, flu, and shark attacks’ necessarily a yardstick against which democrats should assess how much voters hold governments accountable? For many voters such retrospection is ‘blind’ and uninformed (Achen and Bartels 2004). If so, in terms of a wider understanding of democracy than that of retrospective voting, weaker economic voting under globalization could be a blessing, not a curse.

Following this logic, strong effects for small ideological differences on the degree to which the state should seek to shelter its citizens in an unstable world do make sense in an age of globalization. But our findings so far could also be the effects of higher levels of development, education and political knowledge, and differences between new and old democracies. More country cases are needed to explore these questions, and they will be available in future CSES module 3 releases.
Table 1. Country Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Countries in Module 3 Release</th>
<th>Countries in the Analyses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia (2007)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (2006)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus (2008)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (2008)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia (2007)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (2007)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2005)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (2006)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (2007)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea (2008)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (2007)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand (2008)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (2005)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (2006)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (2007)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
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Table 2. Main Government Parties and Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia (2007)</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)</td>
<td>Ivo Sanader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland (2007)</td>
<td>Centre Party of Finland (KESK)</td>
<td>Matti Vanhanen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2005)</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPD)</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (2006)</td>
<td>Kadima</td>
<td>Ehud Olmert</td>
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<td>Japan (2007)</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)</td>
<td>Shinzo Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea (2008)</td>
<td>United Democratic Party</td>
<td>Son, Hak-gyu</td>
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<td>New Zealand (2008)</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Helen Clark</td>
</tr>
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<td>Norway (2005)</td>
<td>Christian Peoples Party</td>
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<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Göran Persson</td>
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<td>Switzerland (2007)</td>
<td>People’s Party (SVP/UDC)</td>
<td>Christoph Blocher</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan (2008)</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)</td>
<td>Ma Ying-Jeou</td>
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### Table 3 Country-Level Differences on Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Log of Financial integration</th>
<th>LR distance from Government Party</th>
<th>Log of Effective Parliamentary Parties (previous election)</th>
<th>Presidential Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Presidential power is measured by the Shugart-Carey index (Shugart and Carey 1992). Updated and additional data from Vowles 2008.
Table 4. Multilevel Models of Incumbent Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Leader</td>
<td>.33*** (.04)</td>
<td>.06 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-R distance from Gov</td>
<td>-.18*** (.02)</td>
<td>-.07 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Performance</td>
<td>.28*** (.05)</td>
<td>.29*** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Party Identification</td>
<td>2.83*** (.07)</td>
<td>2.83*** (.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Leader*FDI</td>
<td></td>
<td>.14*** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right*FDI</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05** (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.29*** (.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance (Intercept)</td>
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<td>.61 (.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance (Gov Leader)</td>
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<td>.009 (.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variance (Left-Right)</td>
<td>.003 (.003)</td>
<td>.0009 (.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-1.47** (.74)</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>11420</td>
<td>11420</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. FDI= Foreign Direct Investment % of GDP. Model 1, multilevel random intercepts only. Model 2, random intercepts and slopes for government leader and L-R Distance. Results have been obtained using the xtmelogit in Stata 11.
Figure 1. Distance Between Average Voter on Left-Right Scale and Main Government Party

NOTE: In the Swiss case, the government left-right score used in the calculation is based on a vote-weighted average of all four government parties collaborator-ascribed positions.
Figure 2. Marginal effect of Leadership over IFI

Figure 3. Marginal effect of Left–Right over IFI
REFERENCES


Hellwig, Timothy. 2008. ‘Globalization, Policy Constraints and Vote Choice’ The
Journal of Politics 70, 4, 1128-41.
Appendix

Table 5. Logistic Robust Cluster Model of Incumbent Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
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<tr>
<td>Government Leader</td>
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<td>L-R distance from Gov</td>
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<td>Government Performance</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. FDI= Foreign Direct Investment % of GDP. Results have been obtained using the logistic regression and vce(cluster) option in stata11.
NOTES

1 For a very cogent summary of the strongest position from this perspective, see Katz and Mair 2009.
2 Although findings here are ambiguous: see, for example, Haupt 2010; Vowles and Xezonakis 2009.
3 However on the perception of governments ‘making a difference’, comparative research indicates economic globalization has no apparent effects (Vowles 2008).
4 Unfortunately Australia in the preliminary release lacks leadership assessment data although this should be added in the next release of the CSES.
5 Specifically, using xtmelogit in Stata 11.1.
6 These figures are based on an alternative logit model using robust standard errors adjusted for clustering, in which the estimates are similar to the multilevel model. See appendix for those results.